I. Introduction
A staggering number of statutes, amendments, and court decisions regulating equal opportunity in employment have been passed during the past 25 years. Firms found guilty of violations of equal employment opportunity laws have been required to pay millions of dollars in back pay and to alter their employment practices to comply with the laws. This study measures the costs to firms resulting from government and private lawsuits, and the further costs of losing those suits. I address this question by examining changes in the market value of the equity of firms at the time a lawsuit is filed for a violation of an equal employment opportunity (EEO) law and at the time a decision of guilty or a settlement is announced. I use the "event-study" methodology pioneered by Fama et al. (1969) . This methodology has been used in a variety of applications,1 but has never been used in the area of discrimination.
A firm's stock price is expected to change in response to a change in stockholders' expectations about the present value of its future cash flows. In particular, a lawsuit charging employment discrimination provides investors with the following information: the firm will face a costly legal defense; if the firm loses the suit it will be required to pay back pay and attorney's fees; and since most firms that are found guilty of discrimination or that make an out-of-court settlement are required to institute an affirmative action program, labor costs may rise as firms are forced to change their employment practices.2
These factors suggest that, if the information is unanticipated, investors would devalue the shares of firms that are sued at the time of the suit. The effects of decisions against the firm and out of court settlements on the value of the firm are less certain. First, even firms that believe they would win a lawsuit may settle to avoid continued and expensive litigation. Second, if the market was expecting an even worse outcome, the announcement of the decision or settlement may represent relatively good news. Third, if discrimination is perceived as inefficient, a settlement which revises the firm's current discriminatory practices may offset the decline in equity value, or even cause stock prices to rise. It should be noted, however, that given the evidence supporting an active market for corporate control, we would not expect employer practices which are systematically inefficient. (See Jensen and Ruback 1983). By examining changes in the market value of firms involved in litigation due to charges of violations of EEO laws, I measure the market's estimation of the total costs of alleged noncompliance, including legal fees, back wages, future changes in employment practices, and any output effects.3 1. Event studies have frequently been used in the finance literature to test the impact on the value of the firm of events such as stock splits, dividend announcements, and stock repurchases. Schwert (1981) explains the use of event studies in measuring the effects of regulation and also provides an extensive bibliography. Binder (1985) tests the impact on stock returns of twenty major changes in regulation. Some other recent applications include strikes (Becker and Olson 1986), OSHA cotton dust standards (Hughes, Magat, and Ricks 1986), environmental quality regulation (Maloney and McCormick 1982) , product recalls (Jarrell and Peltzman 1985) , and unionization (Ruback and Zimmerman 1984). 2. Other costs include the likelihood of additional lawsuits, the time management must devote to the lawsuit instead of attempting to control costs or find profitable investments, and adverse publicity that might result in the loss of sales or lead to higher wages to compensate workers for disagreeable working conditions. 3. Despite the costs associated with a lawsuit, discrimination may be ex ante profit maximizing, as in the case of customer or coworker discrimination. The firm's ex ante decision will depend on the probability that a suit will be initiated and the magnitude of any sanctions
II. Legal Framework and Data
Three major laws and one executive order which regulate equal rights in employment in the private sector are of interest in this paper. Table 1 Many of these suits were settled before going to court: for instance, in 1981, the EEOC won 24 suits and lost 15, while the remainder were settled out of court or dismissed.
period which was more than twice the total number of charges received from its inception in 1965 through 1970. In addition, the EEOC received new power to bring civil suits against private employers when conciliation failed with the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. It is noteworthy that an extremely small percentage of charges received by the EEOC result in EEOC suits. Table 3 summarizes the suits, decisions, and settlements according to charging party and according to covered class. The party that files the suit is considered the charging party. For instance, suits filed by the EEOC on behalf of individuals or classes are classified as EEOC suits.5 5. In this sample, only two of the class actions were filed by the EEOC, while the remainder were filed privately. 
III. Methodology
In an efficient market any new information is reflected immediately in stock prices.6 The event-study methodology pioneered by 7. The statistical significance of the abnormal returns is tested using the t-statistic from Ruback and Zimmerman (1984, p. 1142) where the variance is calculated using the standard deviations from the pre-event period with a correction for heteroscedasticity, so that less weight is given to the prediction errors of more volatile firms. Table 5a reports the cumulative abnormal returns and percent negative for various holding periods for suits, decisions, and settlements. The null hypotheses are that the event has no effect on average stock prices; the alternative hypotheses are that suits reduce the equity value of firms, with the effects of decisions and settlements uncertain, for reasons stated in the introduction.
IV. Results
The average abnormal returns on the announcement day are significantly negative at the 2 percent level in one-sided tests for suits, and significantly negative at the 1 percent and 7 percent levels, respectively, in two-sided tests for decisions and settlements. The major effect of suits and settlements appear to occur on the announcement day, with drops in the average value of the firm of 0.48 percent and 0.29 percent respectively.8 Average abnormal returns over longer periods are not significantly different from zero.9 The main effect of decisions appears to be captured over a four-day event period beginning two days before the Wall Street Journal article. The value of the firm drops an average of 1.59 percent over this period which is nearly triple the one day effect. Longer periods around the announcement day for decisions are not significantly different from zero.'1 These results imply that the announcement of an EEO event does have a significant short-run effect on the value of the firm, but that this effect is relatively minor in the longer run when combined with other factors affecting the value of the firm. The estimated loss in 1982 dollars on the announcement day for the combined sample of suits, decisions, and settlements is $18.5 million. Class actions form a special case since information is likely to be widely available before the suit is filed, as lawyers talk to a great number of affected people before filing the suit. Table 5b reports the cumulative abnormal return and percent negative over selected holding periods for the 48 private class action events in the sample. Although the sample sizes are small, the findings are dramatic-class action suits are associated with a significantly negative average prediction error of 15.6 percent over the period AD-30 to AD + 30. The average prediction errors for suits are significantly negative both before and after the announcement day. The average prediction errors are significantly negative for decisions and settlements on the announcement day, but are not significantly different from zero over the period AD-30 to AD + 30. Thus it appears that most of the information about the class action was reflected in stock prices at the time of the suit."
To examine the effect of event characteristics on abnormal returns, I regressed abnormal returns on variables for charging party (public or private), covered class (sex, race, age), year (1972 or later, when the EEOC received authority to litigate), and reported costs of settling decisions and settlements. The estimated models were not particularly powerful and the regression results are not presented here. The results suggest that private suits reduce the value of firms more than suits filed by public agencies. Differences in the effect of public versus private suits are related to shareholders' beliefs about the strength of the case, the likelihood of winning, and access to funding to finance a costly legal battle. A tentative partial explanation for this finding is that since the EEOC has been criticized for undertaking "frivolous" suits and not dropping weak cases, shareholders may consider EEOC suits weaker than private suits.
Oddly, the results also indicate that the value of firms fell less for settlements that reported the amount of back pay required to resolve the decision or settlement. Since the standard errors are large, these results should be interpreted cautiously, but suggest that stockholders feared a worse outcome than the dollar amounts reported.
Averaged over decisions and settlements with reported costs of resolving the event, the average total required expenditure in back pay, attorneys' fees, and affirmative action program in 1982 dollars is $7.98 million. The average loss to shareholders in 1982 dollars for the corresponding events is $24.2 million, more than three times the direct costs of settling the suit. Some caveats apply: the total loss to shareholders may be greater than the estimates reported here if there is information leakage prior to 11. The average prediction errors on the announcement day for the sample of suits, decisions, and settlements excluding class action (with corresponding absolute t-statistics in parentheses) are -.370 (1.64), -.717 (3.17), and -.190 (1.60) respectively. the announcement; the actual costs of resolving the event after the appeal process is complete may be larger or smaller than the initial reported amounts; and the standard errors of the loss of shareholders and costs of resolving the suit are large.
V. Discussion
There are two major issues that must be kept in mind in interpreting the results: sample selection and the size of the event window.
For an EEO event to be included in the sample, the firm must have stock prices reported on the CRSP tape and the event must be reported in the Wall Street Journal. The first requirement is commonly employed in event studies and restricts the sample to relatively large publicly traded corporations. The restriction to Wall Street Journal events is more troublesome. The Wall Street Journal covers few EEO events. For instance, the 1983 EEOC Annual Report states that the EEOC filed 136 suits in 1983, including suits against Greyhound and Texaco.12 No suits were reported, however, in the Wall Street Journal (nor in the New York Times) in 1983. Perhaps the Wall Street Journal decided that the suits filed in 1983 were not sufficiently interesting to merit coverage.
Since not all EEO events are covered in the Wall Street Journal, it is likely that the events covered are those that may be expected to have the largest impact on the value of the firm. If so, then the average drop in the value of the firm found in this study will exceed the expected loss associated with EEO litigation.
The size of the event window is also an important concern. Since event studies measure changes in stockholder expectations, an article in the Wall Street Journal announcing that a firm is involved in EEO litigation will have an effect on stock prices on the announcement day only if this information is unanticipated. If the information is anticipated then a broader event window is necessary to capture the full effect of the event. Given the nature of EEO events, one would expect that the market does have advance notice of pending EEO litigation. The procedure set out by Title VII allows for a maximum of 610 days between the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice and filing of a suit. During this period the EEOC investigates and attempts to conciliate the charge. Once a suit is filed, the process can be prolonged by the usual legal procedures that occur in any civil suit. Although interim information is infrequently 12. The Annual Report does not give exact dates for any of the EEOC litigation activities. In addition, only a small number of the firms they are litigating are named. Thus, the information provided by the Annual Report is of limited use in an event study. published by the Wall Street Journal, such information is publicly available.
Thus, there is little reason a priori to expect the full effect of EEO action to occur on the announcement day. Yet the results indicate that except for class action suits, most of the impact on stock prices of suits and settlements do occur on the announcement day, and over a four-day span for decisions, with average abnormal returns that are negative and significant in one sided tests at the 95 percent level. Larger time spans that include the announcement day do not yield abnormal returns significantly different from zero. These findings allow at least two possible interpretations: first, the results are a fluke and we commit a type I error in rejecting the null hypothesis of no effect of EEO litigation on stock returns. The second interpretation is that EEO litigation does reduce the value of the firm on average, but has a relatively minor impact over the longer run in combination with the many other factors affecting the value of the firm, just as eating one huge meal will have a relatively minor effect on your weight over the long run but will show up on a scale after the meal. Further, although interim information is available, the information released on the announcement day is new information and does reflect a change in stockholders expectations about the status of the event.
VI. Conclusion
This study measures the impact on the equity value of firms involved in suits alleging violations of equal employment opportunity laws. Based on a sample of 260 events reported in the Wall Street Journal between 1964 and 1986, shareholders on average suffer negative excess returns from both the announcement and the conclusion of an EEO suit. The negative excess returns range from .294 percent on the announcement day for settlements to 15.6 percent over the 61-day holding period centered on the announcement day for class action suits. Since there may be substantial leakage of information prior to the Wall Street Journal announcement, these estimates may underestimate the true costs of EEO events. Further, the average announcement day loss is triple that of the average direct costs to the firm of settling the case. This suggests that the fall in the equity value of firms may be at least partially related to the costs of changing employment practices. This paper offers new information on the economic impact of EEO laws. By examining changes in the market value of the firm around the event, the event study methodology provides an estimate of the total expected costs arising from the lawsuit. The alternative to this approach is to attempt to estimate costs directly from wage and employment data,
